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Introduction 
Whereas the Arab Spring movement itself was a reaction against the general lack of opportunity 
for civil engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, recent Gulf 
Cooperative Council (GCC) protests have shed light on the disproportionally high levels of 
discrimination imposed on Gulf Shi‘a communities both living at home and abroad. While 
modern Gulf Shi‘a currently face political and social disenfranchisement, the status of Arabia’s 
Shi‘a communities has not always been in such jeopardy. The Gulf Shi‘a enjoyed periods of 
political ascendency, especially during the Būyid (945–1055), Fāṭimid (909-1171), and ṭafavid 
(1502–1736) eras. The collapse of Sunni-Shi‘a relations in the Arabian Gulf States is not simply 
the result of longstanding theological differences between two different articulations of Islam. 
Rather, certain unambiguous twentieth-century benchmarks directly lead to the current 
breakdown of Sunni-Shi‘a relations during the Arab Spring movement.  Some of these 
benchmarks include: the legacy of European colonial rule and the establishment of the GCC 
itself, the sectarian division created by the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and 
international energy policies focusing on both oil and nuclear power in the Gulf.   
Arabian Gulf Shi‘a lost significant political authority under European imperial rule, and 
the subsequent consolidation of authoritarian Sunni regimes in the Gulf.  As MENA people 
worked to throw off the yoke of European colonialism, many imperialist writers fought back by 
highlighting the sectarian differences between Sunni and Shi‘a communities. In a letter to her 
father on August 23, 1920, Oriental Secretary to the British High Commissioner Gertrude Bell 
described the status of Shi‘a clerics in a strongly Shi‘a region of Iraq, saying: “It’s as though you 
had a number of alien popes permanently settled at Canterbury and issuing edicts which take 
precedence of the law of the land. The Turks were always at loggerheads with them and the Arab 
govt. of the future will find itself in the same case.”1  Bell’s branding of local MENA Shi‘a as 
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 “alien”, completely discounted their right to the governance of their own community in favor of 
either Arab or Turkish rule.  This type of anti-Shi‘a rhetoric has repercussions in the modern 
Arab Spring movement.  Bell forgot that most Iraqi Shi‘a are in fact Arabs, and have strong 
historical and cultural ties to their homeland.2  This potent rhetorical convention of alienating 
Shi‘a Muslims from their own historical homelands has had profound impact on the Arab Spring 
movement itself.  It is a form of discrimination that is practiced both in the West and in many 
Shi‘a-populated regions of the contemporary MENA world.  The pervasive depiction of Shi‘a 
Muslims as “alien” is evident in the GCC Arab uprisings.  The Shi‘a of the GCC are victimized 
by their own governments, as well as by fellow GCC citizens. This paper focuses on the GCC 
region as a whole because of the shared cultural and religious history of Shi‘a Islam within this 
important part of the MENA world. 
The issues of human and civil rights are at the forefront of the Arab Spring movement 
and the Shi‘a of the GCC are but one of many communities calling for new civil society in the 
Middle East. The response of governments across the GCC is to silence opposition in any form. 
The Shi‘a struggle in GCC countries is essentially a political, not a religious, struggle. All GCC 
protesters share the common goal of seeking political agency, but what differentiates the Shi‘a 
protests from the general Arab Spring movement is that the sectarian identity of Shi‘a protesters 
is being used against them, often taking the shape of state-sanctioned attacks on religious 
expression.  The line between “Arab Spring” and “Shi‘a Spring” protesters is not a clear one, 
(many GCC Shi‘a are Arabs and participate in “Arab Spring” demonstrations), but GCC Shi‘a 
have an increased vulnerability because they follow an expression of Islam that is not part of the 
dominant religious paradigm in the Gulf.  For example, in the wake of Shi‘a solidarity protests in 
Eastern Saudi Arabia in 2009, Saudi authorities closed several Shi‘a mosques and arrested Shi‘a 
religious leaders in the province of Khobar.3 While religious self-determination is not at the 
forefront of protesters’ demands, Shi‘a sectarian identity is currently exploited by the ruling 
parties of the GCC for the purpose of silencing political dissent. Shi’a minority communities 
throughout the MENA region feel the legacy of European imperialism and its toxic repercussions 
in the modern age. 
The term “Arab Spring” is flawed, and deserves closer analysis. The false equivalency, 
equating “modernity” with “Western-style democracy” is a common logical fallacy that is 
echoed in many Western media sources. In February of 2012, Mumbai-born Time magazine 
editor Fareed Zakaria, wrote that “Democracy might be messy. It’s certainly complicated.  It 
takes a while to consolidate. But for the first time in perhaps a millennium, the Arab people are 
taking charge of their own affairs.”4  Statements such as this deprive Arabs of all religious 
backgrounds, of any semblance of political agency, and map a false, ahistorical interpretation 
onto the last hundred years of Arab tradition. Beginning in 2005, the moniker “Arab Spring” 
began emerging, mostly in Western media sources, in reference to supposed pro-Western-style 
democratic movements emerging from places like Beirut, Baghdad, Ramallah, Cairo and 
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 Riyadh.5 However, as massive political protests spread through the MENA region beginning in 
2011, it became increasingly obvious that those protests were in the process of transcending the 
confines of Western-style nationalism and its associated constructs of cultural and ethnic 
identities. It is overly simplistic to define the goal of the Arab Spring movement as simply pro-
Western or pro-democratic. Rather, there are many diverse voices, including those of the GCC 
Shi‘a, who are currently seeking to define what the MENA protest movements of 2011-2015 
mean to them and the future of their own countries.  Shi‘a Muslims, like all people, hold 
staggeringly diverse social, religious, and political views. 
 
Sources and Demography 
The Arab Spring movement is a rapidly changing phenomenon. Scholars do not yet have the 
luxury of long-ranging historical insight in the interpretation of Arab Spring events. By 
necessity, unless one is on the ground in the midst of the protests, information is gleaned 
primarily from media outlets, reports from human rights agencies, and secondary sources.  In 
order to elucidate the role of the GCC Shi‘a in recent MENA protests, this article uses a broad 
survey of both Western and MENA media sources, including many local papers from across the 
region.  The author pays close attention to diverse GCC Shi‘a voices, especially those who are 
working towards the goal of building civil society in the Arabian Gulf. In a recent statement to 
the United Nations, the humanitarian organization Shi‘a Rights Watch criticized the government 
of Bahrain for both the political and religious suppression of Shi‘a citizens.   
The Bahraini Authority has imported security forces on a sectarian basis to repress the 
citizens demanding democratic transition. This has produced regional polarization 
through categorizing victims on each side by their sect… The systematic religious 
persecution practiced against Shia citizens, and non-Shia dissidents demanding reform, is 
a serious threat to regional peace and security and fuels sectarian conflict.6   
Human rights reports emanating from organizations such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) catalogued the systematic discrimination suffered by Shi‘a political 
protesters during the early phase of the Arab Spring movement. Traditional academic sources are 
used to provide historical context for more recent events.  
The specific demographics of Arabian Gulf Shi‘ism are difficult to gauge, as Shi‘ism is not 
always practiced openly, and statistics are sometimes skewed for political purposes.7 
Approximately 70% of the Muslim population of the Gulf practices Shi‘a Islam, a statistic that 
includes primarily Shi‘a Iran. Many, although certainly not all, GCC Shi‘a follow the path of 
Twelver Shi‘ism. On the Arabian side of the Gulf, the statistics are less clear: 
One only has estimates coming from various sources that sometimes greatly differ in 
their assessments.  Recently in 2006, a Riyadh-based think tank, the Saudi National 
Security Assessment Project (SNSAP), gave a general overview of the Shi‘a and Sunni 
population of the Middle East, concerning the Gulf countries, the study mentioned that 
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 the Shia constituted 70% of the Bahraini population, 7% for the Saudi population, and 
35% of the Kuwaiti population.8  
Taqiyya (precautionary dissimulation) was historically practiced by Twelver Shi‘a communities 
in heavily Sunni areas for the purpose of avoiding conflict; therefore the GCC Shi‘a population 
may be somewhat higher.  Scholars of both classical and modern Shi‘ism are often forced to rely 
on hostile sources because of the issue of Taqiyya. 
 
The Early History of Shi‘ism in the Gulf 
Although the historical relationship between Arabia’s Sunni and Shi‘a communities has 
traditionally been quite mutable, the pre-modern Gulf Shi‘a often had higher levels of political 
autonomy than their modern counterparts.  One reason for this is that most Arabian Peninsula 
Shi‘a, including the primarily Shi‘a population of Bahrain, moved away from the controversial 
Carmathian-style Ismailism that was practiced in the Gulf from the 9th through 11th centuries to a 
much more quietist Twelver style of Shi‘ism, which the Arabian Sunni tolerated to a far greater 
extent.9 Ironically, it is this very link to Twelver Shi‘ism that has given rise to political concerns 
by some GCC state leaders in recent years, largely due to the fact that Twelver Shi‘ism is widely 
practiced in Iran. 
During the Abbasid era (750-1258), the Shi‘a exercised appreciable political control over 
both Eastern Arabia and the Hijaz. The economic prosperity and geographic isolation of Eastern 
Arabia allowed for Shi‘a independence from Abbassid political authority. The Shi‘a, particularly 
those of Bahrain, enjoyed economic and political sovereignty under their own leadership 
structure. Scholars such as Werner Ende have suggested that the political reach of the early 
Abbasid era Shi‘a Emirs extended well into the cities of Mecca and Medina.10 Not surprisingly, 
most of the Arabian Shi‘a elites of this era traced their lineage to the family of the Prophet 
Muhammad through the lines of either Hassan or Hussein, enjoying the social status provided by 
their genealogy. By the 11th century, Shi‘a members of the ahl al-bayt were organized in formal 
corporations in the major cities of Islam, including Cairo, Fustat, and Baghdad.11  
Shi‘a political authority in the Gulf continued during the era of the Būyids, a 
confederation of Zaydi Shi‘a Emirs from the Persian province of Dailimān. As Abbassid power 
began to wane in the 10th and 11th centuries, the Būyids exercised de facto control over many 
parts of the Muslim world, including upper Mesopotamia, Eastern Arabia, and portions of Persia. 
Although the Abbassid Caliphs remained the nominal rulers of the Islamic world, the Būyids 
handled many of the Empire’s administrative duties. During this transitional phase in MENA 
history, both the Sunni Abbassids and the Shi‘a Būyids experienced a shift their political and 
religious alliances. As the function of the Abbassid Caliphate became less authoritative and more 
ceremonial under Būyid influence, the Būyids themselves moved away from their Zaydi origins 
and cultivated links with the Twelver Shi‘ism. The Būyids may have chosen to follow the 
Twelver path because the figure of the “Hidden Imam” would pose no threat on the legitimacy of 
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 Būyids leadership.12  The mid-11th century saw the Būyids cede control of the Empire to the 
superior military strength of Turkic Ghaznavid and Seljuqs dynasties. 
Although Būyid authority in the Gulf was short-lived, the influence of Shi‘a Islam was 
felt once again under the Fatimid Caliphs (909-1171). The Fatimids practiced a different 
articulation of Shi‘a Islam than their Būyid predecessors. They followed the Ismaili Imamah 
which, along with a variant succession of the Imamate, held a strong belief in the batin or hidden 
meaning of the Holy Qur‘an. Through both missionary work and revolutionary activities, the 
Fatimids spread their message throughout Mesopotamia and North Africa, and ultimately into 
Yemen and the Hijaz.13  Even though most of the Fatimids eschewed the strongly antinomian 
tendencies of the Carmathians, their adherence to the batin placed them at odds with their non-
Ismaili Muslim compatriots.14  The Fatimids believed that the Imam was the only individual who 
had the authority to interoperate and transmit the true meaning of revelation to the community.15  
The idea of the batin excluded all but the Ismaili religious élite from the implementation of 
religious dogma, and thus prevented many Muslims from full participation in the activities of the 
Empire. This theological issue, combined with the Crusades and Berber uprisings contributed to 
the fall of the Fatimid Dynasty. Nonetheless, the legacy of Fatamid rule on the Arabian 
Peninsula is still felt, especially by the Arabic speaking Shi‘a of Yemen and the Hijaz, some of 
whom still practice Ismailism.16  
From the 16th century onward, there was a resurgence of Shi‘a dominance on the Persian 
side of the Gulf under the influence of the Safavid Dynasty (1501-1737). Although the Safavids 
began as Sufis, they quickly adopted the practice of the Twelver Shi‘sim of their Būyid 
predecessors. In the early years of Safavid rule, the Shi‘a ‘Ulama suppressed both Sunni and Sufi 
forms of religious expression, driving out opponents of Twelver Shi‘ism.17 The Safavid’s attempt 
to expunge Sunni and Sufi Islam from their territories may have been a thinly veiled attempt to 
wrest political power from the Sunni Ottoman Empire (1453-1922).  The Ottomans retaliated by 
insisting that members of the Shi‘a community under Ottoman rule, including the Arabian Gulf 
Shi‘a, follow strict sumptuary and liturgical regulations.18  Under Ottoman authority, there were 
occasions when Maliki judges forced some Shi‘a judges in Bahrain to convert to Sunni Islam.19  
The approach of Safavid authorities in Iran towards differing forms of Islamic expression 
softened as their relationship with the Ottoman Caliphs improved. There is little evidence that 
Sunnis were singled out for persecution in the later years of Safavid rule, as the necessity of 
conflating political conflict with religious polemic was diminished.20  While the relationship 
between the Safavids and the Ottomans remained mercurial, an additional threat to continued 
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 Shi‘a security in the Gulf was soon to come in the form of the European Imperialism under the 
auspices of the English and Dutch East India Companies. 
The establishment and resulting political structure of the GCC itself was strongly 
influenced by both Ottoman and the European colonialism. The Ottoman Empire played an 
important role in the establishment of the modern Saudi State, and the State’s subsequent 
policies regarding the treatment of religious minority populations. In heavily Shi‘a Bahrain, the 
British, in association with the Sunni Arab al-Khalifa regime, ruled the region as an increasingly 
British-dominated protectorate from the 19th through the mid-20th century. Under the al-Khalifa 
protectorate, Twelver Shi‘a religious expression was suppressed, and Shi‘a communities in 
Bahrain were subject to tight state control due to the administration’s concern over Shi‘a 
revolutionary activity.21  
 
Shi‘ism and the Saudi State 
The establishment of Wahhabi Islam in Arabia in the18th century was a direct response to Arab 
perceptions of Ottoman excess, corruption, and spiritual malaise. The development of a volatile 
power-sharing dynamic between the Wahhabi ‘ulama (religious establishment) and the Saudi 
royal family contributed to an increase in anti-Shi‘a rhetoric within the region that became the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Saudi Shi‘a depended on the protection of the Saudi royal 
family from the ‘ulama, who subscribed to Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s belief that the 
Shi‘a are apostates, dangerous heretics whose veneration of the Imamate is a form of shirk 
(polytheism).22  Wahhab summed up this approach towards Shi‘ism in a short book called al-
Radd ‘ala al-rafida (The Refutation of the Rejectionists) based on the ideas mapped out by the 
Abbasid era legal scholar Ahmad bin Hanbal (780-855).23  
In addition to theological challenges imposed by Wahhabi Islam, Shi‘a communities in 
Saudi Arabia were vulnerable because of their strategic location within the Kingdom, and their 
links to both food and energy security. The heavily Shi‘a regions of al-Hasa and Qatif were 
historically the Najd’s major outlet for food production.24  The chiefly Twelver Shi‘a population 
of this important agricultural region was the target of strict state regulation first under the 
Ottoman and then under Saudi rule.25  The precarious position of Saudi Arabian al-Hasa and 
Qatifi Shi‘a was compounded when oil was discovered in these areas in the late 1940’s.  
Traditionally farmers, the al-Hasa and Qatifi Shi‘a soon took low-level jobs in the Saudi 
oilfields. Although they were not permitted to serve in the Saudi army or accepted into other 
national institutions, as of the Arab Spring protests of 2012 the al-Hasa and Qatifi Shi‘a held 
about 60% of the jobs in the ARAMCO Oil company.26  
In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, the Saudi government discovered evidence of Shi‘a 
insurgency in Qatif in the shape of a secret society, aimed at secession from the Saudi State. 
While the Qatifi Shi‘a revolt was quickly suppressed, Saudi Arabia experienced large-scale Shi‘a 
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23Ibid. 
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 uprisings in Qatif again in 1979, coinciding with the Iranian revolution.  This time, the 
revolutionaries were not so easily stopped: 
The concurrence of these episodes in the wake of the Iranian revolution seemed ominous 
to the Saudis.  Indeed, to the 440,000 Shiites of the Eastern Province the call of Ayatollah 
Khomeini constituted an invitation to rebellion.  On November 19, the National Guard 
returned to crush Shi‘a resistance, although violence broke out in al-Qatif again in 
February 1980 and in spring of 1982 reflecting the pervasive sectarian antagonism 
engendered by the Iran-Iraq war.27  
It is this legacy of insurgency that has led Saudi authorities to suppress diverse Shi‘a voices so 
quickly over the last decade, even though the current political goals of the Saudi Shi‘a are far 
different from those of the past.   
 While it is clear that GCC Shi‘a face discrimination, the civil rights of the Saudi Shi‘a 
have not been entirely dismantled, despite the potential threat that a Shi‘a insurrection would 
have towards the food and energy security of the Kingdom. One possible reason the Saudi royal 
family have been willing to protect certain Shi‘a interests is the Shi‘a community would provide 
a buffer against an over-reach of power by the ‘ulama. The Saudi government has given priority 
to its economic and security interests, and fearing a Shi‘a revolution, has encouraged Wahhabi 
followers to exercise restraint towards the Shi‘a.28 The concern of Iranian support for a Shi‘a 
insurrection in the Gulf has lead the Saudi Government to suppress Shi‘a voices by imprisoning 
activists and closing Shi‘a places of worship on the one hand, while protecting them from 
Wahhabi hard-liners with the other. 
 
Gulf Shi‘ism and the Iranian Connection 
The MENA revolutions of the late 1970s and early 1980s were profound turning points in the 
history of the post-colonial world. Shi‘ism was an important demographic component of these 
struggles, particularly in Iran and Lebanon. 
Abortive revolutions in Afghanistan and Lebanon, and the 1979 Islamic revolution in 
Iran, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the subsequent expulsion of the PLO from 
Beirut were soon to completely reshape the Middle Eastern political context… In a 
twinkling, Third World nationalism was finished, along with the Marxist critique of 
imperialist thought.29 
Post-colonial geopolitics clearly played a central role in shaping change in the MENA region, 
however anti-Shi’a factions often cite revolutionary politics in Iran as a reason for Shi‘a 
suppression in the modern age. In some cases, GCC Shi‘a were blamed by their own 
governments for presumed complicity in an Iranian power-grab in the Gulf while simultaneously 
refused the right to assert their own sovereignty. Some analysts have called this deadlock 
between Iran and the GCC the “Cold War in the Gulf”. As one senior Saudi official told The 
Wall Street Journal in 2011: “The Cold War is a reality, Iran is looking to expand its influence. 
This instability over the last few months means that we don't have the luxury of sitting back and 
watching events unfold”.30  While this kind of rhetoric makes dramatic headlines, it does not 
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 fully address the role of the GCC governing bodies and their overseas allies in the escalation of 
tensions with Iran. In addition, it feeds right into the divisiveness that has colored modern Sunni-
Shi‘a relations on the Arabian Peninsula ever since the Twelver Shi‘a Iranian Revolution of 1979 
and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.  
For the Sunni leaders of Arabian Gulf countries, the long and bloody Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-1988) posed a serious threat to GCC security for more than just domestic reasons. It 
exposed the United States and the USSR as unreliable political allies, more interested in fighting 
proxy wars with one another instead of helping their economic allies in the Gulf.31  Some of the 
most economically powerful members of the GCC, such as Saudi Arabia, joined the United 
States in funding Sadaam Hussein’s anti-Shi‘a forces during the Iran-Iraq War. These U.S. allies 
were understandably concerned about retaliation from Iranian Shi‘a factions, as well as anger 
and resentment from local Shi‘a groups in Arabian Peninsula countries. 
All of these events led to a further disenfranchisement of already marginalized Shi‘a 
populations in the GCC, many of whom were ghettoized and denied access to educational and 
job opportunities. Still others were exiled completely from their homelands during the Iran-Iraq 
war. Although the Saudi government subsequently invited many of these exiled Shi‘a back 
home, the Saudi Shi‘a minority continue to face many challenges in seeking inclusion in the 
political process. For example, although the Saudi municipality of Qatif is nearly 100 percent 
Shi‘a, all of the top positions the city are held by Sunni Muslims.32  
The Iranian Revolution, and the following Iran-Iraq War contributed an environment in 
the GCC states that was plagued by lasting division, not only along sectarian, but also socio-
economic lines. Saudi Arabia in the 1980s saw the release of many anti-Shi‘a, pro-Salafi 
publications. During the Iran-Iraq War, Ibrahim Sulayman al-Jabhan wrote a sweeping 
condemnation of Shi‘a Islam entitled Removing the Darkness and Awakening to the Danger of 
Shi‘ism to Muslims and Islam (1980). Al-Jabhan’s anti-Shi‘a propaganda was officially licensed 
by the office of the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia.33  While many of the anti-Shi‘a 
publications of the 1980s focused on blunting the ideological appeal of the Iranian Revolution, 
they caused lasting damage to the safety and economic stability of Shi‘a populations across the 
GCC region.34    
The repercussion of this sectarian divisiveness spread across the Arabian Peninsula in the 
1980’s, masking the very real issue of rising Islamism in the region.35 The Kuwaiti government’s 
concern over the rise of Shi‘a factionalism produced the unintended consequence of increased 
domestic Islamism, comprised primarily of two specific groups, the Muslim Brotherhood-
oriented Social Reform Society and the Salafiyyin of the Islamic Heritage Society. “As a result, 
the Sunni fundamentalist movements, with some official blessing, had an almost free hand in 
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 conducting a campaign of influence, ‘brainwashing,’ and intimidation among the population”.36  
Because of the animosity between the Sunni elite and their Shi‘a citizenry, even an imagined 
Shi‘a rebellion in the Arabian Gulf States has the potential to dissolve the political power that 
has been in the hands of many of the same GCC families since before the colonial era. 
Despite accusations of collusion with Iranian interests, most GCC Shi‘a have made it 
very clear that they don’t want Iran to meddle in their domestic affairs. Ali Salman, the leader of 
Bahrain’s Shi‘a opposition party, cautioned against the danger of his people being placed in the 
line of fire in a proxy war between Iran and the GCC. He was particularly concerned about the 
role of Saudi Arabia in a potential GCC showdown with Iran.  On March 30th of 2011, Salman 
told the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya news service: “We urge Iran not to meddle in Bahraini affairs.  
We demand Saudi Arabia withdraw the Peninsula Shield forces.  We do not want Bahrain to turn 
into a battlefield for Saudi Arabia and Iran.”37  As tensions continued to rise between the GCC 
superpowers and Iran, it became increasingly difficult for Shi‘a citizens to voice their 
dissatisfaction due to the lack of representation they have in the process of political decision-
making.  
Joining Shi‘a voices, many human rights watchdog organizations such as the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) have expressed their concern over Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s 
recent suppression of their Shi‘a citizenry’s civil liberties. “Bahrain’s harsh crackdown and 
Saudi military intervention are fanning the flames Manama and Riyadh say they want to 
extinguish”, explains Joost Hiltermann, ICG’s MENA deputy program director. “The most 
effective response to the perceived threat of a Shiite takeover and greater Iranian influence is not 
the violent suppression of peaceful street protests, but the equal treatment of all citizens and steps 
toward a constitutional monarchy and an inclusive parliament with real powers”.38 Hiltermann’s 
statement clearly mirrors the appeals of Shi‘a protesters and activists in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, the UAE, and many other regions of the Gulf.  Indeed, some of the challenges that GCC 
Twelver Shi‘a communities face today are reminiscent of the political events that took place in 
the Persian Gulf during Shi‘a uprisings in Saudi Arabia of the 1970s and 1980s. Other GCC 
countries were concerned that the Shi‘a insurrection would spread throughout the Gulf. In 
Kuwait, during the period of the Iran-Iraq War, instances of forced conversion from Shi‘a to 
Sunni Islam were not uncommon.39  
 
GCC Shi‘a and the Arab Spring 
Despite its apparent inclusiveness, it is unlikely that the Arab Spring movement will reject the 
trap of sectarianism within the Muslim community itself. While the GCC Shi‘a are but one of the 
many groups seeking to define their role in the 21st century MENA world, they experience some 
specific challenges that set them apart from other Arab Spring activists.  One of the major 
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 stumbling blocks that Shi‘a protesters in the Gulf face is the often-erroneous perception that they 
are not Arab, but rather Iranian, and as such Shi‘a populations in the Gulf suffer from 
xenophobia. While some, although certainly not all, GCC Shi‘a have historical roots in Iran, 
most are Arabic speakers who have lived in the Gulf region for many generations. The GCC 
Shi‘a are inspired by the Arab Spring movement, but they are also threatened by a strong 
backlash from political and religious authorities. Reports from organizations such as HRW have 
documented institutionalized discrimination against Shi‘a by GCC authorities in Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia from the beginning of the Arab Spring movement through the current calendar year 
(2015).  
Authorities in most Gulf countries oppose the protestors on political grounds, both at 
home and abroad, seeking to preserve the status quo.  The GCC Shi‘a are currently working to 
align the multinational interests of GCC governing bodies with the domestic goals of Arabian 
Peninsula Shi‘a communities. Traditionally adherents to the construct of political and religious 
quietism, the GCC Shi‘a have broken their silence to lobby for constitutional reform in the 
Arabian Peninsula. Many GCC Shi‘a are demanding greater representation for Shi‘a interests in 
GCC parliamentary bodies.  For example, Bahrain’s main Shi‘a opposition group is refusing to 
concede their demands for a government led by a parliamentary majority. On July 13 of 2011, 
Egypt’s Al-Ahram newspaper reported that the Shi‘a Islamic National Accord Association (Al-
Wefaq), the largest political society in Bahrain was insisting on increased parliamentary 
representation for Shi‘a nationals. Al-Wefaq argued that “[t]he solution to the political crisis is 
through the acceptance of (its) demands,” and that “any other option would only deepen the 
crisis”.40 However, mounting tension between Shi‘a Iran and the predominantly Sunni members 
of the GCC governing council places the cause of Shi‘a protesters throughout the region in 
serious jeopardy. As political events continue to unfold, it is becoming clear that local GCC 
Shi‘a communities are in an increasingly vulnerable situation. Shi‘a populations across the Gulf 
region are becoming the target of state-sanctioned street violence, arbitrary imprisonment, 
deportation, and torture.41   
One example of state-sanction anti-Shi‘a discrimination took place in Bahrain’s capital 
city of Manama in the spring of 2011 targeting the first wave of protests: 
Authorities have held secret trials where protesters have been sentenced to death, arrested 
prominent mainstream opposition politicians, jailed nurses and doctors who treated 
injured protesters, seized the health care system that had been run primarily by Shiites, 
fired 1,000 Shiite professionals and cancelled their pensions, detained students and 
teachers who took part in the protests, beat and arrested journalists, and forced the closure 
of the only opposition newspaper.42  
Stripped of their political and human rights, the Arabian Peninsula Shi‘a risk becoming pawns in 
a stand-off between Iran and the GCC elite, as their original demands for political representation 
and social equality are ignored by the politically powerful on all sides.  The demands of GCC 
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 Shi‘a are made both as members of the GCC community, and as an often marginalized religious 
minority community.   
As anti-Shi‘a rhetoric increased across the MENA region as a result of the Arab Spring, 
the spring of 2011 saw a rash of attacks against members of the GCC Shi‘a communities, as well 
as the destruction of local Shi‘a places of worship. Following a long historical trend whereby 
government institutions destroy religious sites for the purpose of silencing and marginalizing 
entire communities, the government of Bahrain undertook a campaign of demolishing Shi‘a 
sacred spaces, such as the four-centuries-old Amir Mohammed Barbaghi mosque, and the 
Momen mosque.43  
The hand of religious intolerance has also touched modern public spaces throughout the 
GCC region. The large sculpture at the center of Bahrain’s Lulu (Pearl) roundabout was 
destroyed in March of 2011 by the government after it became the focal point of Shi‘a protests. 
Invectives against members of the Shi‘a community appeared on buildings, engineered to terrify 
both the Shi‘a, and members of the GCC population in general. On May 13, 2011, abusive 
graffiti appeared on the walls of Kuwait University’s College stating: “Iran is invading us” and 
“God curses those who have woken up the sedition”.44 These statements reveal the notion that 
religious identity, even one that is Islamic, somehow transcends the dictates of pan-Arab 
nationalism, becoming essentially foreign. Again, this is extremely problematic historically, as it 
completely ignores the fact that many GCC Shi‘a are ethnically Arab, speaking the Arabic 
language as their mother tongue, while a significant minority of GCC Sunni Muslims are of 
Persian origin.45 
Bahrain, with its majority Shi‘a population, was at the epicenter of the Shi‘a political 
movement in the GCC region, as well as the backlash against it. According to a May 30, 2011 
article by BBC News referencing the Bahrain Shi‘a protests: 
It is clear that most reformers are modest in their demands, by western standards. They 
don't want the ruling family kicked out or strung up (although the prime minister who has 
been in power, unchallenged, for 41 years is the focus for special dislike, even hatred) 
and argue for a constitutional monarchy. They say it would be a natural development of 
the Gulf tradition.46  
The subject of political activism in Bahrain during 2011 is of great importance, and deserves its 
own thorough examination, especially considering the Bahraini Archipelago’s uneasy 
relationship with Iran over the last century. In 1957, the Iranian parliament unsuccessfully 
claimed that Bahrain was the fourteenth province of Iran. Proving ideological, in addition to 
national, independence from Iran is posing a difficult issue for the Shi‘a of Bahrain. 
Political and social violence against Bahrain’s Shi‘a community was extreme in recent 
years. Amnesty International reported that in the build-up to the October 23, 2011, elections 23 
Shi‘a protestors were detained and subsequently tortured:  “[A]ll 23 men are charged with 
‘forming an illegal organization’ aiming to ‘overthrow the government and dissolve the 
constitution’, inciting people to ‘overthrow and change the political system of the country’, 
                                               
43Ibid. 
44Mona Karim. “Shia phobia hits Kuwait.” Jadaliyya.  May 17, 2011 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1603/shiaphobia-hits-kuwait- (Accessed 4/20/2013). 
45Lindsey Stephenson. “Ahistorical Kuwaiti sectarianism.” Foreign Policy.  April 29, 2011   
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/29/ahistorical_kuwaiti_sectarianism (Accessed 6/28/2012). 
46
 James Naughtie. “Will Bahrain’s Arab Spring bear fruit?” BBC News.  May 30, 2011.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9499000/9499462.stm. (Accessed 9/28/2013). 
11
Patterson: The Shi’a Spring: Shi’a Resistance and the Arab Spring Movement i
Published by Iowa Research Online, 2015
 fundraising and planning terrorist acts, and other offences under Bahrain’s 2006 anti-terrorism 
law”.47  The Shi‘a of Bahrain are in a unique situation in comparison with other Arabian 
Peninsula Shi‘a populations. Bahraini Shi‘a are a demographic majority, albeit one with few 
rights.  
Repressive tactics by Bahrain’s government pose a clear challenge to Sunni-Shi‘a 
solidarity. In a recent report on popular protest movements in North Africa and the Middle East, 
the ICG cautioned that sectarian divisions between Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims in Bahrain are at 
historically high levels: 
…many Shiites have a family member or friend killed or in jail. By oppressing Shiites as 
a group, the regime is erecting communal boundaries; by closing off any avenue of 
political participation and targeting even moderate opposition groups such as Al-Wifaq, it 
is laying the groundwork for a potential future uprising.48  
In other words, suppression of Shi‘a rights in the Gulf could engender further demonstrations 
and even rebellion.  
Political violence against Shi‘a protestors is clearly documented in HRW’s 2012 World 
Report, which covers, among other things, the events that took place in 2011 in Bahrain. “In 
April four people died in custody, apparently as a result of torture and medical neglect. The body 
of one—Ali Isa Ibrahim Saqer, arrested in connection with the deaths of two police officers—
bore unmistakable signs of torture on his body.”49 Arrests of children and the denial of protesters 
to legal representation are contained in the same report. 
Despite the magnitude of Bahrain’s Shi‘a activism, it is important to recognize that Shi‘a 
communities in GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia (especially in the region of Qatif) and, to a 
lesser extent, Kuwait are facing similar challenges from both Sunni-led government 
organizations and the general Sunni population. Minority Shi‘a communities in the GCC states 
such as Saudi Arabia are even more vulnerable to attacks because they lack the numbers for a 
massive protest movement. As the borders of current GCC member states are relatively new, (the 
GCC Charter wasn’t signed until 1981), it is worth taking a holistic look at the different Shi‘a 
political movements in the GCC states during the early phases of the Arab Spring. Many 
communities in the Gulf are historically extraterritorial to existing national boundaries, and Shi‘a 
groups are found in every single GCC member country from Oman to Qatar. It is also essential 
to be aware that the geopolitical interests of GCC member states are often intertwined.  
The transnational importance of the Arabian Gulf Shi‘a activism was brought into sharp 
focus on March 11, 2011, demonstrating the strong connection between Saudi and Bahraini 
interests. Frustrated by a lack of open dialogue with the al-Khalifa regime, thousands of Bahraini 
Shi‘a marched on the Sunni township of Rifa‘a, a region containing several al-Khalifa palaces. 
Three days later, on March 14th, the Saudi government sent military forces to aid the al-Khalifa 
regime in driving out the Shi‘a protesters. This action points to the complicity of GCC governing 
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 bodies to silence Shi‘a voices within the borders of the GCC - this despite calls from the Obama 
administration (a GCC ally) for increased dialogue and a protection for the peaceful protesters in 
the MENA region.50  
Not once does the GCC Charter make mention of either Sunni or Shi‘a designations, or 
indeed refer to any divisions at all within the Muslim community. According to the GCC 
Charter, one of the main goals of the organization is: “to channel their efforts to reinforce and 
serve Arab and Islamic causes”. In fact, the opening statement of the charter reads. “Being fully 
aware of the ties of special relations, common characteristics and similar systems founded on the 
creed of Islam which bind them…”.51  The right of Islamic expression that is guaranteed in the 
GCC Charter is being curtailed, not only in Bahrain, but also in other GCC member countries. 
While GCC leaders have expressed their concern over links between Arabian Peninsula 
Shi‘a activism and Iran, they have also been worried for many years by links between the GCC 
Shi‘a and Lebanon’s Shi‘a-led Hezbollah faction. This is especially true in recent years when 
Hezbollah has achieved greater political legitimacy within Lebanon itself. On March 30th of 
2011, Al-Arabiya reported that Bahrain’s interior Minister Rashed bin Abdullah Al-Khalifa held 
a press conference announcing that twenty-four people, four of them police, were killed in a 
month of unrest, linking the troubles to Lebanon's “Iran-backed” Shi‘a group Hezbollah.52  
While it wouldn’t necessarily preclude their involvement in Bahrani politics, statements such as 
this ignore the fact that Hezbollah has become increasingly involved with nationalist interests in 
Lebanon during the Arab Spring. Even though the GCC Shi‘a protestors deny working with 
Hezbollah, the Bahraini government strategically used sectarianism as a political tool by making 
accusations of Hezbollah’s complicity in the “Shi‘a Spring” movement. “The militant group 
Hezbollah is actively plotting with the opposition in Bahrain to overthrow the country's ruling 
family”, the government said in a confidential report to the United Nations. “Evidence confirms 
that Bahraini elements are being trained in Hezbollah camps specifically established to train 
assets from the Gulf”.53  Bahrain has long made claims that the Iranian government has guided 
Hezbollah to fuel instability in the kingdom.  
Bahrain is not alone in their condemnation of suspected Hezbollah factionalism in the 
Gulf.  In 2009, the UAE expelled dozens of long-term Shi‘a residents over their presumed 
connection to Hezbollah. However, there was some dispute over the question of whether they 
were actual Hezbollah sympathizers or simply political protesters. “The common factor among 
all those expelled in the past three months is that they are all Shiites and as such are part of a 
community that supports the resistance,” Hassan Alayan, (who heads a committee representing 
them), told the Associated Foreign Press on October 1, 2011.54 
These expulsions were not an isolated event in recent years. In 2010 UAE authorities 
expelled hundreds of long-term foreign residents on the grounds that they posed a threat to 
national security. According to Amnesty International’s 2010 International Report: those 
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 affected were Palestinians, notably from Gaza, and Lebanese Shi‘a Muslims. Some were said to 
have been residents in the UAE for up to 30 years. HRW interviewed one of these Lebanese 
deportees, a University of Sharjah professor. According to her 2010 HRW statement, she was 
called for an interview with UAE immigration officials on June 10 of 2009, just three days after 
Lebanon’s parliamentary election. “During the four-hour interrogation, an officer accused her of 
belonging to a Hezbollah ‘sleeper cell’.” She said her interrogator also “mocked my [Shi‘a] 
religious beliefs and practices in a very callous way that was quite painful and agonizing since I 
could not answer back or defend myself.” The same reports states that she and the other 
deportees have not been permitted to appeal their cases to UAE immigration authorities.  Many 
of the deportees have lost their homes and family businesses in the UAE. 
Saudi Arabia has also called for Arab involvement in fighting against Hezbollah interests 
both at home and abroad. In a recent Arab league conference, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince 
Saud Al-Faisal compared Hassan Nasrallah (the secretary general of Hezbollah) to former Israeli 
Prime Minister Arial Sharon: “They both invaded Beirut. The legitimate government in Lebanon 
is being subjected to an all-out war. We, the Arab world, cannot stand idly by as this happens”.55 
By attacking the political agendas of foreign groups such as Hezbollah, and linking them to the  
“Shi’a Spring” movement, GCC leaders may be hoping to obscure their own role in creating 
their nation’s current culture of political hostility and the subsequent anti-government protests.  
Extraterritorial political events such as Hezbollah activism, and even the Syrian uprising, have 
the potential to severely disrupt the Shi‘a Spring movement. In addition, these events provide 
political cover for authoritarian crackdowns on Shi‘a civil society.  
 
The Geopolitics of Shi‘a Activism in the Gulf 
While the scapegoating of MENA Shi‘a communities is not a new phenomenon, the 
recent backlash against Shi‘a protesters set a dangerous precedent.  Casting an entire group of 
people in the role of “other” has the potential to further erode the human rights of the GCC Shi‘a. 
One reason why their position in the GCC region has become increasingly unstable in recent 
years is due primarily to uncertainty over Iran’s expanding nuclear program. Western think-
tanks, such as the Brookings Institute, have perpetuated the notion of Iran’s sponsorship of 
militant Shi‘ism in statements such as the following: “Shi’a terrorists, unlike their Sunni 
counterparts, enjoy direct state support and for that reason are far more likely to originate from 
Iranian embassies, consulates and state-run businesses.”56 In the Gulf, the Arab Spring 
movement in general, and for the Shi‘a specifically, such sweeping statements about the nature 
of Shi‘a insurgency serve as a catalyst for sectarianism. The GCC Shi‘a are convenient targets 
for local fear mongering over the issue of mounting nuclear tensions between Iran, the GCC, and 
allied countries. Claims of complicity between GCC Shi‘a and outside Shi‘a groups such as 
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or other foreign groups like the Lebanese-based 
Hezbollah have been exaggerated for the purpose of political expediency. As Rami G. Khouri 
observed, “the popularity of the 'Arab Spring' term across the Western world quietly mirrors 
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 some subtle orientalism at work, lumping all Arabs as a single mass of people who all think and 
behave the same way.”57 In the same way, lumping all Shi‘a into a single monolithic “other” is a 
form of orientalism that exists in the West as well as the MENA region.  
Much of the increasing anti-Shi‘a political activity in the Gulf is the result of fear and 
mistrust. The GCC and its political and economic allies have been concerned about Iran’s 
nuclear program for some time, but their fears over Iran’s nuclear capability have escalated 
within the past ten years. In 2002 and 2003, the international community learned of clandestine 
research into fuel enrichment that demonstrated Iran’s nuclear ambition went beyond that of 
peaceful energy production.58  In 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved an 
amended European draft resolution that called for a ban on trade with Iran in goods related to its 
nuclear and ballistic missile programs, which did little to discourage Iran’s research into nuclear 
technology.59 In May of 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency released a nine-page 
report that raised questions about Iran’s investigation into nuclear technology. This report 
indicated that Iran had the technology to develop a type of atom bomb known as an implosion 
device.60 The GCC is clearly concerned about Iran’s capability to use shorter-range nuclear 
weapons in the Gulf region, while GCC allies such as the United States are more concerned 
about Iran striking out against Israel. 
Mistrust of the United States’ political and economic motivation in the Arabian Peninsula 
has been growing among GCC member countries, especially in the aftermath of George W. 
Bush’s “weapons of mass destruction” scandal and the ensuing Second Gulf War. Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE, and other so-called rentier states on the Arabian Peninsula, have strong political and 
economic interests in preserving the status quo in the Gulf. As the oil economy on the Arabian 
side of the Gulf begins to flag, nuclear technology is one option that GCC states have discussed 
in great depth. According to a 2011 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ 
Middle East Program:  
In search of alternatives, some GCC states have considered investing in nuclear or solar 
energy for desalination and electricity production. But these solutions present their own 
complications… (such as) a uranium fuel shortage in the near future.61  
Theoretically, nuclear competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran would include a struggle for 
raw materials.  Should Iran continue its current nuclear program, an arms race with Saudi Arabia 
is almost inevitable.  Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal disclosed to military personnel at a Royal Air 
Force base at Molesworth that “Iran (developing) a nuclear weapon would compel Saudi 
Arabia...to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences.” The 
prince was quoted as saying: “If they successfully pursue a military program, we will have to 
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 follow suit”.62  Despite Saudi Arabia’s signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Saudi 
Arabia is rumored to have supplied nuclear support to both Pakistan and Iraq.63  Potential 
casualties of these nuclear ambitions, the GCC Shi‘a are targeted simply because of their 
historical religious connection with Iran, furthering the political divide between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. 
Iran is not alone in pursuing its nuclear ambitions. Other GCC countries have expressed 
interest in developing nuclear technology. The UAE has signed a nuclear cooperation agreement 
with the United States, which will test the resolve of the UAE to support its allies in the Gulf 
region. The UAE and Iran have had an inconsistent relationship in the past. On the one hand, the 
UAE and Iran have historically argued over land rights, such as the ownership of Al-Musa 
Island. At the same time, the UAE is one of Iran’s most powerful trading partners, with bilateral 
trade agreements reaching US$12 billion according to a 2011 Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace report.64 Of all the members of the GCC, the UAE has made the best use of 
diplomatic channels with Iran in the past, however in recent years communication between the 
two oil-rich countries has begun to break down. 
Even with powerful trading incentives, the UAE seems to be moving away from Iran, and 
aligning itself with its GCC partners. On July 6, 2010, Mr. al-Otaiba, the UAE Ambassador to 
the United States made the following statement to The Washington Times. “I think it’s a cost-
benefit analysis,” Mr. Al-Otaiba said. “I think despite the large amount of trade we do with Iran, 
which is close to $12 billion … there will be consequences, there will be a backlash and there 
will be problems with people protesting and rioting and very unhappy that there is an outside 
force attacking a Muslim country; that is going to happen no matter what.” He continued, “If you 
are asking me, ‘Am I willing to live with that versus living with a nuclear Iran?,’ my answer is 
still the same: ‘We cannot live with a nuclear Iran. I am willing to absorb what takes place at the 
expense of the security of the UAE.’”65  Where this leaves the UAE’s Shi‘a communities, 
comprising approximately 16% of the UAE total population, is unclear. 
The global instability over oil prices has had an indelible effect on the political stability 
of Shi‘a communities in the Gulf region. According to OPEC, Saudi Arabia controlled 22.2% of 
the OPEC’s crude oil reserves in 2010, second only after Venezuela at 24.8%.66  Governments, 
such as that of Saudi Arabia, which rely heavily on petrochemical dollars, are very vulnerable to 
shifts in oil prices because of their lack of diversification. Any threat, either from internal protest 
movements or from an outward arms race with Iran, could damage Saudi Arabia’s economic 
stability. 
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 Saudi King Abdullah, in association with other Arab leaders, recognized the problem of 
Shi‘a disenfranchisement, and worked to resolve the issue of sectarian discrimination in the 
MENA region. In 2003, King Abdullah underwent a number of high-level national dialogue 
sessions aimed at bridging sectarian differences in Saudi Arabia. King Abdullah’s push towards 
the recognition of internal religious pluralism was one of the first of its kind in the kingdom.67  
Despite efforts to bridge the gap between various Muslim sectarian groups in the Gulf, the 
advent of the Second Gulf War and the subsequent rise in Iraqi sectarian violence did little to 
assuage tensions between Sunni and Shi‘a communities in the Gulf. In response to rising 
sectarianism in the kingdom, human rights organizations such as the ICG have called for 
increased Shi‘a representation in the Saudi government, a moratorium on bans on Shi‘a religious 
rituals, and a condemnation of anti-Shi‘a hate speech.68  
The marginalization of the GCC Shi‘a in national and local politics has far-ranging 
implications. Journalist Qassim Abdul-Zahra wrote in the March 11th, 2011 Washington Post that 
Iraqi Prime Minister, and former Shi‘a dissident under Sadaam Hussien, Nouri al-Maliki recently 
expressed his concern that violent clashes between Sunni and Shi‘a groups in Iraq could 
potentially inflame sectarian violence in the entire MENA region, including the Gulf states. In 
August of 2011, the International Herald Tribune reported that a Gulf foreign minister made the 
statement that the GCC is now “ready to enter war with Iran and even with Iraq in defense of 
Bahrain”, which he called a red line: “Every state of the Gulf Cooperation Council is a red line. 
All are the same and we are ready to enter war to defend ourselves.”69 Statements such as this 
raise serious security concerns for Shi‘a communities in the entire MENA region.  
The problem of both externalized and internalized anti-Shi‘a discrimination is far from 
over in the modern world. “Today the United States peers at the Middle East through orientalist 
spectacles. Their special properties miraculously filter out historical context and complexity, the 
better to spotlight the supposedly essential cultural features of Middle Eastern culture that make 
‘them’ hate ‘us’”.70 The flames of anti-Shi‘a rhetoric are fanned by the impossible to prove 
supposition that the greater political freedom given to Shi‘a communities in the Gulf will 
ultimate lead to a rising tide of Shi‘a Islamism.  In a recent article, James Leigh and Predrag 
Vukovic attempt to argue just that:   
In all of this we could expect to see a greater voice of political Islamism coming from the 
Shia populations of the Gulf States. When that begins to appear, it may herald a growing 
and accelerating influence of Iranian Islamism over Shia populations, in the Gulf States, 
to influence their countries’ foreign oil policy. Iranian Islamism’s influence may also 
extend to other Islamic Arab states, for example, across North Africa.”71  
The Arab Spring movement has caused both fear and hope among members of the GCC Shi‘a 
community. The Arab Spring movement, and by extension, the Shi‘a Spring movement, are 
currently in a transitional phase. On the one hand, the GCC autocrats feel threatened by Shi‘a 
activism, while on the other hand, the international community is becoming increasingly aware 
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 of political corruption and the suppression of human rights by GCC leaders. Discrimination 
against religious minority groups is not a new historical phenomenon, but it is one that has 
potentially catastrophic ramifications. 
 
Conclusion 
Currently, many MENA governments, including members of the GCC, fear political coups as a 
result of Arab Spring protests and political activism. By playing on the discourse of xenophobia, 
whether it concerns Iran or Lebanon, GCC leaders run the risk of inflaming sectarian violence 
across the entire MENA region. Historically, one way to shift the blame from your own failed 
regime is to pick a largely helpless and disenfranchised minority to accept the blame for you, and 
the GCC Shi‘a are at risk of falling victim to increasing sectarian violence. 
While finding their political voice will be difficult, there is still hope for the future of the 
GCC Shi‘a. The international community is largely supportive of MENA protestors’ efforts for 
political reform, and outraged by the human rights abuses levied on peaceful protestors. While 
the protests in Egypt are at the epicenter of the Arab Spring movement’s media attention, there is 
increasing coverage of political affairs in the Gulf, including Shi‘a protest movements. Political 
protest, especially when the protesters use non-violent methods, as most GCC Shi‘a protesters 
have done, draws attention and sympathy for those disenfranchised by the dominant regime. 
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